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Abstract The Knaster’s procedure is one of the simplest and most powerful mechanisms for
allocating indivisible objects among agents requiring them, but its sealed bid feature may in-
duce some agents in altering their valuations. In this paper we study the consequences of false
declarations on the agents’ payoffs. A misrepresentation of a single agent could produce a gain
or a loss. So, we analyze a possible behavior of a subset of inﬁnitely risk-averse agents and
propose how to obtain a safe gain via a joint misreporting of their valuations, regardless of the
declarations of the other agents.
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1. Introduction
In the literature, the problem of the allocation of a set of indivisible items with mone-
tary compensations was tackled with a procedural approach by many authors. We just
mention the pivotal works of Knaster (1946) and Steinhaus (1948) and refer to Brams
and Taylor (1996 and 1999) for a survey on more recent papers. For other topics related
to division problems we address to Young (1994) and Moulin (2003).
The interest for a procedural approach descends from the possibility of a “practical
implementation of a fair division outcome, in particular when parties in real life prefer
to establish fairness by themselves” (see Haake, Raith and Su, 2002).
We deal with the Knaster’s procedure, in which the values of the objects for each
agent are assumed to be additive; this implies that for each agent the value of an ob-
tained object is independent from who has obtained the other objects. One of the most
important features of this procedure is that it is based on the valuations of the agents
of the objects to be assigned; these valuations are presented via a sealed bid mecha-
nism and are used to determine the objects received and the amount of the monetary
compensation of each agent. We are motivated to devote our attention to the Knas-
ter’s procedure because it is simple to implement, easy to understand and, in case the
agents truthfully report their valuations, satisﬁes two relevant theoretical properties:
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efﬁciency (there exists no other distribution that yields every agent a higher payoff)
and proportionality (each of the n agents thinks to receive at least one n-th of the total
value). For more details see Brams and Taylor (1996 and 1999).
As it was pointed out by Brams and Taylor (1996) “a potential drawback of Knas-
ter’sprocedureisthatplayerscanproﬁtablymisrepresenttheirpreferencesiftheyknow
the monetary values that the other player(s) attribute to the items.” On the other hand,
false declarations can be risky as an agent does not know the secret declarations of the
others.
In this paper we start with a deeper analysis of the misrepresentations of the valu-
ations, computing the actual advantage (or disadvantage) of such manipulations, sup-
posingthateachagentknowsonlyhisvaluationanddoesnotmakeuseofanystatistical
information on the valuations of the other agents. Next, we go further, showing that a
proper subset (coalition) of at least two completely risk-averse agents may proﬁt from
an information exchange on their true valuations, and a consequent agreement on alter-
ing their declarations; in this way they may get a safe gain w.r.t. the situation of truthful
declarations.
In the existing literature, several authors studied the problem of manipulation in
allocation mechanisms that associate an allocation to each set of agents’ declarations.
In this context the notion of strategy-proofness (non-manipulability) means that truth-
ful report is a dominant strategy (Svensson 1999 and 2009). According to Holm-
str¨ om (1979) there is no Pareto efﬁcient and strategy-proof procedure, consequently
the Knaster’s procedure is manipulable, due to its efﬁciency.
Here, we consider a different concept of manipulation considering that an inﬁnitely
risk-averse agent wants to incur no risk, i.e. he wants always to gain by misrepresenting
his valuation, independently from the declarations of the other agents. In this context
the Knaster’s procedure is non-manipulable.
Various authors considered situations in which agents may form coalitions jointly
misreporting their valuations; they obtained other concepts of manipulation and corre-
sponding concepts of coalition-strategy-proofness. For example, in Moulin (1993) a
mechanism is coalition-strategy-proof when “if a joint misreport by a coalition strictly
beneﬁts one member of the coalition, it must strictly hurt at least one (other) member”.
According to this deﬁnition the Knaster’s procedure is manipulable. In the following
we consider another concept of coalition-manipulability, the collusion: A coalition can
manipulate with no risk a procedure if its members can always gain by truthful reve-
lation of their valuations, misrepresentation of the declarations and reallocation of the
payoffs, independently from the declarations of the other agents. We show that a coali-
tion of at least two inﬁnitely risk-averse agents, but obviously not all, can manipulate
the Knaster’s procedure. Other concepts of manipulability and strategy-proofness can
be found in Papai (2000) where the reallocation-proofness via swapping the assigned
items is considered and in Serizawa (2006) that studies pairwise strategy-proofness.
When monetary compensations are allowed, we may refer to Schummer (2000) for
bribe-proofness and Papai (2003) for dominant strategy incentive compatibility when
envyfreeness is a relevant aim.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section recalls the scheme of the Knas-
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ter’s procedure; Section 3 analyses the advantages and the risks for an inﬁnitely (i.e.
completely) risk-averse agent misrepresenting his true valuations; the characteristics
of a collusive behavior are presented in Section 4; Section 5 concludes.
2. The Knaster’s Procedure
Inthissection, webrieﬂyrecalltheprocedureproposedbyKnaster(1946). Wesuppose
that m indivisible objects b1,...,bm, M ={1,...,m}, have to be assigned to the agents of
the set N ={1,...,n}. The ﬁnal result is the assignment of each object to just one agent
with monetary compensations. Preliminarily, each agent i ∈ N declares to a mediator
(in a sealed bid) his valuations vi1,...,vim of the items; let Ei = 1
n åk∈Mvik, i.e. Ei is the
initial proportional share according to the valuations of agent i. Then the procedure
goes as follows:
Step 1 each object bk, k ∈ M is assigned to an agent j(k) that gives the maxi-
mal valuation, j(k) ∈ argmax vik, i ∈ N (if more agents give the same
maximal valuation of an object it is assigned randomly);
Step 2 for each agent i ∈ N, let Gi = åk:j(k)=ivj(k),k; Vi = Ei + s
n, where s =
åj∈N(Gj −Ej);
Step 3 for each agent i∈N, if the monetary amountVi−Gi is positive the player
i receives it in addition to his objects;
otherwise player i pays Gi−Vi.
Citing Brams and Taylor (1996), the surplus s is non-negative; the division is
proportional, as for each i ∈ N, Vi ≥ Ei; the sum of the compensations is zero, as
åj∈N(Gj −Vj) = 0, so the procedure does not require or produce money.
According to a private communication of Fink to Brams in 1994, mentioned in
Brams and Taylor (1996), the Knaster’s procedure can be rewritten considering object













where sk = vj(k),k−åi∈N
1
nvik ≥ 0 for each k ∈ M.
So, it is easy to check that we obtain the same allocation with the Knaster’s proce-
dure and with the following procedure applied to each single item bk, k ∈ M:
Step 1 the object bk, k ∈ M is assigned to an agent j(k) that gives the maximal
valuation which pays the monetary amount vj(k),k (if more agents give
the same maximal valuation of the object it is assigned randomly);
Step 2 each agent i ∈ N receives the amount 1
nvik;
Step 3 the remaining amount sk is equally shared among all the agents.
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In the next section we study the possible misrepresentations of the valuations of
the agents. According to what we said above, we can suppose to have to assign just
one object, and study the consequences of manipulations for this object; eventually, we
sum up the results for each item.
3. Misrepresentation
Suppose that the true valuations of a set of agents N = {1,...,n} for the unique object
are denoted by vi, i ∈ N. For sake of simplicity let v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vn and in case
of several agents giving the same maximal valuation, v1, let 1 be the agent that gets
the object, after the random assignment. Consequently, at the end of the procedure,
agent 1 gets the object, pays n−1






, whereas each agent








Now, we suppose that one agent decides to make a different declaration for the
object, with the aim of increasing his payoff, while the other agents do not modify their
declarations. To make simpler this analysis we consider separately the two situations
in which agent 1 or one of the other agents manipulates his declaration.
Case A. Agent 1 decreases valuation; no change in allocation
Agent 1 declares v1 −e with e < v1 −v2, so he still has the highest declaration. He
gets the object, pays n−1








variation of his payoff is
(n−1)2






n åj∈N vj + 1
ne
￿
and his payoff reduces of n−1
n2 e.
Case B. Agent k increases valuation; no change in allocation
Agent k ∈ N \{1} declares vk +e with e < v1 −vk, so agent 1 still has the highest




n2 åj∈N vj − 1
n2e; as the
variation of the payoff is n−1
n2 e, he has a gain only if e > 0. Agent 1 gets the object,
pays n−1




n åj∈N vj − 1
ne
￿
and his payoff reduces of 1
n2e; each agent





n åj∈N vj− 1
ne
￿
and his payoff reduces of 1
n2e.
It is straightforward to check that in cases A and B the gain of the agent that mo-
diﬁes his valuations is equal to the sum of the losses of the other agents (note that the
total allocated value is v1). Moreover, the variations of the payoffs depend only on
the variation of the declaration, e, and on the number of agents, n, and is independent
from the declarations of the other agents. Then, we investigate what happens when the
variations are such that agent 1 no longer gets the object.
Case C. Agent 1 decreases valuation; object allocated to agent 2
Agent 1 declares v1 −e with e > v1 −v2 and the object goes to agent 2 that declares





n åj∈N vj + 1
ne
￿
, suffering a loss of 1
n(v1 −v2)+
n−1
n2 e. Agent 2 obtains the object, pays n−1








the variation of his payoff is 1
n2e − 1






n åj∈N vj + 1
ne
￿
and his payoff varies of 1
n2e − 1
n(v1−v2).
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Case D. Agent k increases valuation; object allocated to agent k
Agent k∈N\{1} declares vk+e with e >v1−vk and gets the object; he pays n−1
n (vk+




n åj∈N vj − 1
ne
￿
; so, his payoff reduces of 1
n(v1 −vk)+
(n−1)2









variation of his payoff is n−1
n2 e − 1






n åj∈N vj − 1
ne
￿
and his payoff varies of n−1
n2 e − 1
n(v1−vk).
In case C, the difference between the new and the old payoff for the agents i ∈ N\
{1} is positive if e > n(v1−v2). In case D, the difference between the new and the old
payoff for the agents i ∈ N\{k} is positive if e > n
n−1(v1−vk). In both cases the false
declaration results in a socially inefﬁcient situation. In fact, if the agent k∈N\{1} gets
the object, the sum of the payoffs of the agents is vk and the assumption that v1,...,vn
are the true valuations of the agents plays an important role.
We conclude the section with a simple example in order to better explain the pre-
vious results.
Example 1. Suppose that the true valuations of the four agents I, II, III and IV the
objects are as in the following table:
I II III IV
240 192 80 64
The object goes to agent I and the ﬁnal payoffs are 84, 72, 44 and 40, respectively.
Now, we consider the following cases:
A Agent I decreases his true declaration of 16 units
B Agent II increases his true declaration of 16 units
C Agent I decreases his true declaration of 208 units (losing the object)
D Agent II increases his true declaration of 80 units (getting the object)
C’ Agent I decreases his true declaration of 64 units (losing the object)
D’ Agent II increases his true declaration of 56 units (getting the object)
The payoffs are in the following table:
I II III IV
True valuations 84 72 44 40
A 93 69 41 37
B 83 75 43 39
C 33 73 45 41
D 87 15 47 43
C’ 60 64 36 32
D’ 82.5 28.5 42.5 38.5
Note that in case C’ the decreasing of 64 units of agent I is less than n(v1−v2) =
192 and in case D’ the increasing of 56 units of agent II is less than n
n−1(v1−v2) = 64;
consequently, the inefﬁcient allocation of the object to agent II, causes a loss to all the
agents.
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Example 1 shows that the misrepresentation of the valuations may be risky for an
agent if he does not know in advance the declarations of the other agents.
4. Collusion
In this section we study how a suitable information sharing and consequent agreement
among at least two agents avoids the risk of a loss.
Deﬁnition 1. A collusion of a coalition of completely risk-averse agents consists of:
1) truthful revelation among them of their valuations;
2) same declaration of the highest true valuation;
3) binding agreement on the gain sharing.
In the following of the section, we show that if a coalition of completely risk-averse
agents behaves according to the above deﬁnition it may obtain the highest safe gain,
independently from the declarations of the other agents.
To make the reasoning simple, we start analyzing a 2-agent collusion. Suppose that
agents i and j agree on altering their declarations and let vi and vj be their valuations,
with vi > vj. As vj cannot be the highest valuation (w.r.t. all the agents), it is not an
advantage to decrease it. On the other hand, vi could be the highest valuation or not; if
it is, then it is not convenient to increase it, otherwise it is not convenient to decrease
it. If the agents want to run no risk we have the following result.
Proposition 1. If two completely risk-averse agents, i and j, agree on misreporting
their valuations vi and vj, with vi ≥ vj, they obtain the highest safe gain when agent
i declares his valuation vi and agent j increases his own up to vi, regardless of the
valuation of the other agents.
Proof. Let bi and bj be the declarations of agents i and j, with bi ≥ bj. W.l.o.g. let us
suppose that agent i declares bi > vi and gets the object, implying that bi ≥ v1. In this




















On the other hand, if they both declare vi, independently from getting or not the object,















Taking into account the above inequalities on bi,bj,v1,vi,vj, it is easy to check that the
latter payoff is larger than the ﬁrst one.
Now, we consider the case in which none of the two agents obtains the object; in






conclude the agents have the possibility of further increase their joint payoff w.r.t. both
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declaring vi, but they may incur the risk of getting the object in case bi > v1, against
the hypothesis of complete risk-aversion. ￿
If agents i and j make the same declaration vi according to Proposition 1, at the
end of the procedure (besides the monetary compensations among all the agents) one
of the following three cases happens:
1. The object is assigned to another agent. The colluding agents know that agent
j gains n−1
n2 (vi −vj) and agent i loses 1
n2(vi −vj). This means that if agent j
compensates agent i for his loss then they may share the total gain n−2
n2 (vi−vj).
2. The object is assigned to agent i. The situation is similar to that in case 1, but
part of the payoff of agent i is represented by the object.
3. The object is assigned to agent j. If agent j gives the object to agent i and receive
the monetary amount vi the two agents are in a situation equivalent to the case 2.
Now, we investigate the credibility of truthful revelation among two completely
risk-averse agents.
Proposition 2. If a completely risk-averse agent i decides to look for an agreement
with another agent j with imitation of the highest valuation, he may obtain the highest
safe gain truthfully revealing his valuation to agent j.
Proof. According to Proposition 1, if he declares a false higher valuation v0
i > vi he
may incur the risk of getting the object with a lower payoff. On the other hand, if
he makes a lower false declaration v0
i < vi, if v0
i ≥ vj the two agents obtain a lower
total payoff, as n−2
n2 (v0
i −vj) < n−2
n2 (vi −vj); moreover the loss and the consequent
compensation of agent i reduce, as 1
n2(v0
i −vj) < 1
n2(vi −vj) and a completely risk-
averse agent prefers do not incur this risk. ￿
Agent i always suffers a loss, so his gain originates from the sharing of the total
gain, therefore a binding agreement is necessary.
Note that the colluders may know in advance their total gain on the basis of the
knowledge of the number of agents, n, and of their own valuations, vi and vj; moreover,
at the end of the procedure they become conscious of their payoffs if the collusion had
not taken place. This provides the colluders a further element for stating how to divide
the total gain (for instance they may agree on a division proportional to their payoffs if
they did not collude).
To better explain the collusion, let us exemplify it.
Example 2. Referring to the situation in Example 1, let us suppose that agents I and
III collude, so the sealed bids of the agents are:
I II III IV
240 192 240 64
As agent III increases his declaration of 160 units, the colluders may compute that
agent III will get a gain of 30 units and agent I a loss of 10 units, so agent III refunds
the loss of agent I and the two agents share the gain of 20 units.
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Now, we want to investigate if the agents may increase their gains enlarging the
set of colluders. Let L = {i1,i2,...,il} be the set of colluders, with the agents ordered
according to weakly decreasing valuations, i.e. vi1 ≥ vi2 ≥ ... ≥ vil; in this case the op-
timal strategy is that all the agents declare the highest valuation vi1. As in the previous
case of two colluders, the agreement includes the possibility that the agent that receives
the object from the mediator transfers it to one of the colluders with the actual highest
valuation with a monetary compensation.
The increase of the declaration of agent i2, (vi1 −vi2), generates a gain of n−1
n2 (vi1 −
vi2) for him and a loss of 1
n2(vi1 −vi2) for the other l−1 agents in L, so the ﬁnal gain
for the colluders is n−l
n2 (vi1 −vi2). Repeating the same reasoning for the other agents
i3,...,il we obtain that the total gain for the colluders is GL = n−l
n2 åj=2,...,l(vi1 −vij).
The gain of the colluders is independent from any ﬁxed (false or true) declaration of
the agents not involved in the collusion. Consequently, if two or more groups of collud-
ers form, the variation of the total payoff of each group is not affected by the formation
of the others. Of course the ﬁnal payoff of each agent depends on the declaration of all
theagents. ReferringtosituationinExample1, letusconsiderthefollowingfourcases:
Collusion I II III IV
A ∅ 84 72 44 40
B {I, II} 81 81 41 37
C {III, IV} 83 71 43 43
D {I, II},{III, IV} 80 80 40 40
It is easy to check that for agents I and II the variation of total payoff from the case A
to B, i.e. 6 units, is equal to the variation from the case C to D; analogously for agents
III and IV the variation of total payoff from the case A to C, i.e. 2 units, is equal to the
variation from the case B to D.
Referring to the situation in Example 1, we may note that the collusion among
agents I and II gives them G{I,II} = 6, the collusion among agents I and IV gives them
G{I,IV} = 22, and the collusion among agents I, II and IV produces the gain G{I,II,IV} =
14. So, enlarging the set of colluders the gain may increase or decrease. Also the




Moreover, the gain of a collusion among all the agents is always zero, as l = n. So, we
may state the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The gain GL has no monotonicity property.
We conclude the section with an example, referring to a hypothetical division of
an inheritance among several heirs, that is a classical application of the procedural
approach, as pointed out by Brams and Taylor (1996 and 1999) and by Young (1994).
In such a situation it is possible that some heirs have a stronger relationship among
them, so they decide to collude against the others.
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Example 3. Suppose that four heirs Anne (I), Barbara (II), Christine (III) and Daniel
(IV) have to divide an estate consisting of an apartment, a studio and a farm. The
valuations are as in the following table:
I II III IV
Apartment 800 880 840 920
Studio 120 96 80 88
Farm 120 144 160 136
The Knaster’s procedure assigns to Anne the studio and 166 (with a ﬁnal payoff of
286), to Barbara 306, to Christine the farm and 136 (296) and to Daniel the apartment
but he has to pay 608 (312).
Suppose that Anne, Barbara and Christine are sisters, so that they have an incentive
in colluding. So, they declare the highest valuation, among their ones, for each item:
I II III IV
Apartment 880 880 880 920
Studio 120 120 120 88
Farm 160 160 160 136
W.l.o.g., let us suppose that with false declarations the items are assigned as with ac-
tual declarations, but the compensations are different: Anne receives 181, Barbara 301,
Christine 141 and Daniel pays 623. So, the total gain for the sisters is 15.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyzed the behavior of the agents that misrepresent their valuations
in an allocation process, when the Knaster’s procedure is the mechanism for assigning
objects and compensations to the agents. We may say that the Knaster’s procedure is
a manipulable mechanism; in fact, each agent has the possibility of a declaration for
an object that increases his payoff w.r.t. the true valuation, unless he has the highest
valuation and this coincides with that of at least another agent.
On the other hand, the agent does not know the declarations of the other agents,
and then he cannot say which declaration is proﬁtable. Up to this point we agree with
the opinion of Raiffa (1982), that on the basis of some examples, concludes that “al-
though one can’t really say that the Steinhaus scheme [really the Knaster’s procedure]
encourages honest valuations, in many situations it may be the pragmatic thing to do.
Honesty in this case is the supercautious strategy ... it is also a good strategy against
an extreme or naive exaggerator ... (and) it is the easiest and most socially desirable
thing to do.”
The property of coalition-strategy-proofness (see Moulin, 1993) does not hold be-
cause two agents may improve their payoffs with coordinated false declarations, but
again if they do not know the declarations of the other agents they may run a risk (see
the proof of Proposition 1). The collusive mechanism studied in this paper is suitable
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for completely risk-averse agents that look for a safe gain, obtaining a total gain that
does not depend on the declarations of the other agents, so they may know it before the
end of the procedure.
On the other hand, the collusive behavior is considered illegal. For instance in case
of bankruptcy of a ﬁrm, according to the Italian Civil Code (art. 2929), the ofﬁcial
receiver may ask for the retraction of the assignment of the goods if a written or tacit
collusion is suspected or supposed. Then, an agent may decide to start a collusion with
other agents when there exist no moral constraints and some exogenous relationship
among the agents (for instance the sisters in Example 3).
Summarizing, the Knaster’s procedure has good characteristics from the point of
view of individual manipulation, but not so good in case of coalitional manipulation.
Possible further developments are in the direction of introducing a Bayesian game
in which the types of the players depend on their valuations and the agents may have
beliefs on the types of the other agents and consequently, on their valuations.
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